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ABSTRACT 
Proxemics theory explains peoples’ use of interpersonal dis-
tances to mediate their social interactions with others. Within 
Ubicomp, proxemic interaction researchers argue that people 
have a similar social understanding of their spatial relations 
with nearby digital devices, which can be exploited to better 
facilitate seamless and natural interactions. To do so, both 
people and devices are tracked to determine their spatial re-
lationships. While interest in proxemic interactions has in-
creased over the last few years, it also has a dark side: 
knowledge of proxemics may (and likely will) be easily ex-
ploited to the detriment of the user. In this paper, we offer a 
critical perspective on proxemic interactions in the form of 
dark patterns: ways proxemic interactions can be misused. 
We discuss a series of these patterns and describe how they 
apply to these types of interactions. In addition, we identify 
several root problems that underlie these patterns and discuss 
potential solutions that could lower their harmfulness. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Authors of human-computer interaction papers concerning 
innovative design ideas tend to forward their central idea in 
a positive – often highly idyllic – light. True critical perspec-
tives are rarely offered. When they are, they tend towards a 
few cautionary lines in the discussion, or relegated to future 
work where its actual use would be examined. The problem 
is that many of our new innovations involve designing for 
ubiquitous computing situations that are extremely sensitive 
to intentional or unintentional abuse (e.g., privacy, distrac-
tion and intrusion concerns). Rather than wait until some fu-
ture field study of our technology (where it may be too late 
to address emerging concerns), we should consider the ‘dark 
side’ of our technologies at the outset.  
The particular innovation we are concerned with is proxemic 
interactions, which was inspired by Hall’s Proxemic theory 
[13]. The theory explains people’s understanding and use of 
interpersonal distances to mediate their social interactions 
with others. In proxemic interactions, the intent is to design 
systems that will let people exploit a similar ‘social’ under-
standing of their proxemic relations with their nearby digital 
devices to facilitate more seamless and natural interactions 
[12]. This is especially important as we become immersed in 
ubiquitous computing ecologies, i.e., where we carry and are 
surrounded by myriads of devices, all potentially capable of 
interacting with one another. Examples include: mobile de-
vices that understand their spatial relations to mediate infor-
mation exchange between nearby devices [19, 22]; large dis-
plays that sense people’s position relative to them, where 
they dynamically adjust what is shown and how people can 
interact with them [28, 17, 20]; public art installations that 
respond to the movement and proximity of people within its 
sphere to affect what is shown [26]; application areas such as 
home media players that monitor the distance and orientation 
of its viewers to dictate what is shown [2], and information 
visualizations that tune their visuals to people’s position rel-
ative to them [16]. The literature also includes more general 
essays about the role of proxemics, such as how it can ad-
dress well-known challenges in Ubicomp design [21].  
Yet it is clear, at least intuitively, that there is a dark side to 
proxemic interactions. For example, the systems above rely 
on sensing people and their devices within the surrounding 
environment. Indeed, [12] describe several sensed dimen-
sions that would be valuable to system design: distance, ori-
entation, and movement of entities relative to one another, 
the identity of these entities, and contextual information 
about the location. While their purposes are honorable, such 
sensing – as well as the inevitable inaccuracy of interpreting 
and translating that information into action – immediately 
raises concerns by experts and non-experts alike about pri-
vacy, errors, distraction and intrusion. In addition, dystopian 
visions of the future hint at abuses of such technologies – a 
well-known example is the movie Minority Report that illus-
trates how a character is selectively bombarded by targeted 
advertisements as he moves in a public space.   
In this paper, we revisit the idea of proxemic interactions, 
where our goal (and contribution) is to present a critical per-
spective – the dark side – of this technology. Our method is 
to articulate potential dark patterns indicating how we think 
this technology can be – and likely will be – abused, and anti-
patterns in which the resulting behavior occurs as an unin-
tended negative side effect. To avoid being overly broad, we 
focus our scope somewhat to people’s proxemic interactions 
with large (and mostly public) displays, although we do il-
lustrate other examples as needed. 
DARK PATTERNS AND ANTI-PATTERNS 
Architect Christopher Alexander introduced the notion of de-
sign patterns: a documented reusable and proven solution to 
an architectural design problem [1]. Design patterns are typ-
ically derived by examining existing solutions to design 
problems (which may include ‘folk’ solutions) and general-
izing them. Design patterns were later advocated as a way of 
describing common solutions to typical software engineering 
problems [11], and to interaction design problems [5]. They 
are usually structured as a name, a problem that explains it, 
a solution that describes how the problem is solved, and con-
sequences of applying the pattern [11].  
A dark pattern is a special kind of pattern, defined as: 
 “ a type of user interface that appears to have been carefully 
crafted to trick users into doing things [where these user 
interfaces] are carefully crafted with a solid understand-
ing of human psychology, and they do not have the user’s 
interests in mind.” − Brignull et al. [7]  
Brignull et al. created a web-based library of dark patterns 
concerning intentionally deceptive e-commerce practices 
[7,6]. Their specific goal was to recognize and name these 
practices so that people would be aware of dark patterns in 
an interface, and to shame the companies using them. For 
example, they describe a ‘hidden cost’ pattern that “occurs 
when a user gets to the last step of the checkout process, only 
to discover some unexpected charges have appeared”, illus-
trated by how several named companies use it. 
Highly related to dark patterns are anti-patterns that indicate 
a design failure or non-solution [18], or an otherwise bad de-
sign choice. While dark patterns are intentional, anti-patterns 
are designs that unintentionally result in a negative experi-
ence or even harm [31].  
In the remainder of this paper, we combine the notion of dark 
patterns and anti-patterns somewhat more broadly. We artic-
ulate not only possible deceptions and misuses of proxemic 
interactions (dark patterns), but also problems that may ap-
pear even when the designer has reasonable intentions (anti-
patterns). Unlike true patterns that are based on analyzing a 
broad variety of existing solutions, we draw from a broad va-
riety of domains to derive our patterns. We consider the dark 
side of emerging uses of proxemics in commercial, experi-
mental and research, fictional portrayals of such technologies 
foreshadowed by the popular literature and cinema, and our 
own reflections of where misuses could occur. We also re-
visited the dark pattern library [7] to see if and how they 
could be applied to proxemic interactions (possibly as varia-
tions). That is, our patterns are a mix of those that describe 
existing abuses and those that predict possible future ones. 
Our pattern articulation process is somewhat akin to affinity 
diagramming, where we clustered the examples we saw and 
named them as patterns. Unlike an empirical analysis (which 
is infeasible given the youth of this area), we use these ex-
amples to speculate on what could be.  
We do not differentiate whether a particular pattern is dark 
vs. anti: as our examples suggest, the difference between the 
two often arises from the designer’s intent rather than a par-
ticular design feature. That is, the same pattern – depending 
on the designer’s intent – can be viewed as either a dark pat-
tern or an anti-pattern.  
While the novelty of proxemic interaction makes pattern 
elicitation somewhat of a thought exercise (albeit grounded 
in existing examples where possible), we believe this ap-
proach to be appropriate for forecasting – and ideally miti-
gating – the dark side of our future technologies before actual 
deceptive patterns become widespread. We now turn to our 
patterns. Afterwards, we discuss how many of our patterns 
arise from several foundational issues.  
1. THE CAPTIVE AUDIENCE 
The person enters a particular area to pursue an activity that 
takes a given time, and that does not involve the system. The 
system senses the person at that location, and begins an un-
solicited (and potentially undesired) action based on the fact 
that the person is now captive. 
Unlike desktop computers, technology can be spatially lo-
cated in an environment to leverage a person’s expected rou-
tines. When done for beneficial purposes, the technology en-
hances or supports what the person normally does at that lo-
cation – one of the basic premises of embodied interaction 
[9]. The captive audience pattern instead exploits a person’s 
expected patterns and routine for its own purposes, where the 
system knows that the person cannot leave without stopping 
what they otherwise intended to do. 
Novo Ad (www.novoad.com), for example, produces adver-
tising mirrors that display video ads on mirror-like screens 
ranging in size from 21–52”. The Novo Ad web site on its 
Advertising Mirror page states: 
 “the system serves as a mirror screen which identifies fig-
ures standing in front of it and switches itself automatically 
on. At start-up the screen displays a 6 second long ad on a 
full screen, which is later reduced to ¼ of the screen”.  
Novo Ad identifies public washrooms as one of the prime 
locations for their displays, and even created a promotional 
video showcasing their technology in a woman’s washroom 
(YouTube ID: PXwbacfAwnY) as sketched in Figure 1. The 
woman becomes the captive audience, as her primary task is 
to use the sink and mirror for grooming. The video ad, which 
starts on her approach, is the unsolicited system action. Other 
captive locations listed by Novo Ad include dressing rooms 
and elevators.  
Captive Media, a British company, takes this one step further 
(www.captivemedia.co.uk). They estimate that a man using 
a urinal is captive for ~55 seconds. They place screens di-
rectly above the urinal (Figure 2, left), and use proximity and 
‘stream’ sensors “to detect the position of a man’s stream as 
he pees” (Figure 2, right). This information is then used to 
activate advertising-sponsored pee-controlled games as illus-
trated in Figure 2. Later, we discuss how Captive Media has 
various positive policies in place to mitigate dark pattern ef-
fects, where it tries to balance the benefits to product user (by 
game play) and the client (by effective advertising).  
Some ATMs employ the captive audience pattern in a partic-
ularly effective way, at least for the advertiser. By displaying 
advertisements when customers are waiting to receive cash 
or have their bankcard returned, they exploit that the captive 
customer cannot leave or divert their attention without risk-
ing loss of the desired transaction or even one’s bank card.  
As another example, BBDO Düsseldorf and Sky GO devel-
oped a device that can transmit audio advertisements to com-
muters resting their head against the train window. Commut-
ers suddenly hear an advertisement that is inaudible to other 
passengers and sounds like a voice in their head. The trans-
mitter works by sending high-frequency vibrations through 
the window, which are then picked up in the commuter’s in-
ner ear using bone conduction. 
‘15 Million Merits’, the 2nd episode of the dystopian Black 
Mirror Channel 4 television series, also includes several ex-
amples of the captive audience pattern. It portrays a future 
where each person’s bedroom is built out of display walls 
that are always on when that person is present (Figure 3). 
They can only be turned off temporarily when a person 
makes a payment, or by leaving the room.  
2.  THE ATTENTION GRABBER 
The person happens to pass by the field of view of a strategi-
cally located system. The system takes deliberate action to 
attract and keep that person’s attention. 
Attracting attention of a passerby is an exceedingly common 
strategy used by anyone selling a product or service: the goal 
is to turn the passerby into a customer. Carnival barkers, 
greeters in establishment doorways, aggressive street ped-
dlers − all verbally address a passerby to try to get them to 
enter into a conversation and ultimately into a sales transac-
tion. Establishments use storefronts and windows to adver-
tise their wares. Flashing lights and myriads of public sign-
age and billboards (some electronic and digital) commonly 
compete for the passerby’s attention.  
Proxemics-aware public devices are perfectly poised to grab 
attention of passersby. Like barkers and greeters, they can 
sense the passerby as an opportunity, as well as gauge how 
well their attention-getting strategies are working by how the 
person responds. For example, turning to face the device, or 
stopping, or approaching the display all suggest that a per-
son’s attention is momentarily acquired. 
The dystopian future depicted in the movie ‘Minority Re-
port’ contains a scene that popularized this scenario.  Multi-
ple advertising walls detect the protagonist John Anderton 
moving through a crowded hallway. All walls vie for his at-
tention in a visual and audio cacophony. The ad wall for 
Guinness Draught, for example, shouts his name along with 
a directed message: “John Anderton, you could use a Guin-
ness right about now!” 
Figure 2. Captive Media screenshot  (YouTube ID: 
XLQoh8YCqo4#t=44), © Captive Media, with permission. 
Figure 1. Novo Ad screenshot (sketch by David Ledo). Figure 3. Scene from Black Mirror (sketch by David Ledo). 
An example of an existing simple but compelling public dis-
play in this genre is the Cheil Worldwide Nikon D700 Guer-
rilla-Style Billboard (Figure 4). Located in a busy subway 
station in Korea, it displays life-size images of paparazzi that 
appear to be competing for the passerby’s attention. When 
the passerby is detected in front of the billboard, lights flash 
(as in Figure 4) to simulate flashing cameras. The red carpet 
leads to a store that sells the type of cameras being used. 
Within advertising and marketing, this pattern is commonly 
referred to as AIDA, an acronym for: attract Attention, main-
tain Interest, create Desire, and lead customers to Action 
[27]. Wang et al. [30] extended AIDA to proximity-sensing 
digital displays by their Peddler Framework, itself an exten-
sion of the Audience Funnel [23]. The framework covers six 
interaction phases a person may be in, all of which can be 
inferred by the proxemics measures of distance, motion, and 
orientation. Each phase indicates increasing (or decreasing) 
attention and motivation of the passerby [30]. 
a) Passing by relates to anyone who can see the display.  
b) Viewing & reacting occurs once the person shows an ob-
servable reaction. 
c) Subtle interaction happens if the person intentionally 
causes the display to react to his movement and gestures. 
d) Direct interaction occurs when the person moves to the 
center of the display and engages with it in depth. 
e) Digressions and loss of interest occur when a person ei-
ther looks away from the display, or starts moving away 
from it. 
f) Multiple interactions occur when the person re-engages 
with the display.  
g) Follow-up actions happen after interactions with the dis-
play are completed.  
Wang et al. then illustrate a proxemics-aware public adver-
tising display for selling books [30]. It exploits the phases 
above to attract and retain the attention of a passerby. For 
example, the initial attention of a passerby is attracted by 
rapid animation of a pictorial product list; once the passerby 
looks at the display, the animation slows down to become 
readable (Figure 5, left). If the person approaches the display, 
various products are featured by growing in size. If the sys-
tem detects him looking or moving away, it tries to regain 
the passerby’s attention using subtle animation, e.g., by shak-
ing particular displayed products (see 5, right), and by dis-
playing other potentially interesting products.  
Commercial interest in attention-grabbing systems are in-
creasing. For example, Apple’s iBeacon is an experiment 
that recognizes a person (via her iPhone) at specific locations 
in an Apple store. Notifications about a particular nearby 
product are then sent and displayed on that person’s phone.  
While the above examples illustrate how proxemic displays 
can grab attention in an entertaining and perhaps subtle man-
ner, they can also be obnoxious. An earlier version of the 
Peddler system [30] displayed flashing graphics and shouted 
out loud audio messages to the passerby. The more the dis-
play was ignored, the more insistent it became. The Black 
Mirror episode mentioned previously includes an extreme 
example of a fascist Attention Grabber pattern within the 
context of a Captive Audience pattern: the display wall 
shown in Figure 3 detects when the person is trying to shut 
out the displayed information by sensing if that person’s eyes 
are closed, or turned away. If so, it plays increasingly annoy-
ing sounds and messages to force the person to look at the 
content. 
Figure 5. Proxemic Peddler. Left: Attention-attracting animation slows if passerby gazes at display. Right: Product graphic shakes 
to re-attract attention if person turns away [30]. © Wang, Boring & Greenberg, with permission. 
Figure 4. The Nikon D700 Billboard (sketch by David Ledo).
3. BAIT AND SWITCH 
The system baits the viewer with something that is (from the 
viewer’s perspective) desirable, but the system then switches 
it to something else after the person directs his or her atten-
tion to it and moves closer.  
Brignull et al. characterize this pattern as follows [7]: 
“The user sets out to do one thing, but a different, undesir-
able thing happens instead. This is one of the oldest tricks 
in the book, and it is very broad in nature…” 
Consider the case where a public display has gained a 
viewer’s attention because the viewer is in fact interested in 
the ‘bait’ being displayed (e.g., an apparently incredible of-
fer). The viewer ‘opts-in’ by approaching the display. In turn, 
the display recognizes the viewer’s interest and offers further 
enticing details concerning its content. The viewer’s atten-
tion becomes increasingly focused. Once the viewer is fully 
drawn in, the system then switches to something else. A typ-
ical ‘switch’ would be to an inferior or more costly product 
purportedly because the initially advertised product is no 
longer available. Another switch may require the viewer to 
sign up to some otherwise unwanted service before the 
viewer can proceed (which could also become a security is-
sue). Yet another switch is the introduction of other content 
(i.e., unexpected advertising) in this process. 
A compelling (and in this case useful) bait-and-switch exam-
ple was developed by Amnesty International, where they cre-
ated a bus-stop display that detects when people are looking 
at it (menstrualpoetry.com/postimages/amnestyinterna-
tional_happensnobodywatchingbig.jpg; also YouTube id: 
DQl_pnuNskQ). When no-one’s gaze is directed at it, it dis-
plays a scene showing domestic violence, which is viewable 
out of the corner of one’s eye (Figure 6a). Yet when a person 
turns to look at the display directly, it changes into a photo 
of the couple pretending to be happy (Figure 6b). A slight 
delay is introduced so that people can get a glimpse of the 
switch-over. This example is also relevant to the Attention 
Grabber pattern. 
Bait and switch also exists in other proxemics-aware systems 
that do not use public displays. Consider public wireless net-
works such as those at airports. They detect travelers within 
its range, and offer the bait of what appears to be free-of-
charge wireless. Yet once a traveler is apparently connected, 
the network may require the traveler to give up information 
by signing into some service, or the offered ‘free’ service 
may be so slow that the alternate higher quality pay service 
is the only realistic offering.  
4. MAKING PERSONAL INFORMATION PUBLIC 
As the person enters a particular area, the system makes that 
person’s personal information publicly visible. 
One of the appeals of proxemic interactions is to make per-
sonal information readily available on nearby devices. Vogel 
et al’s original work on ambient displays [28] illustrated how 
a public ambient display reveals both public and personal in-
formation as a person approaches it. Personal information in-
cludes calendars, notifications, and directed messages, which 
can then be manipulated by that person. 
Their system is intended to be helpful. Yet the basic issue is 
that other onlookers can see that personal information.  Vo-
gel et al. tried to mitigate this by describing how the person’s 
body could physically shield personal information presented 
directly in front, and how the person could hide information 
through an explicit gesture [28]. 
The previously mentioned scene from ‘Minority Report’, 
with its myriads of advertising walls, make passerby’s pri-
vate information public as a byproduct of their clamor for 
attention. We see the Guinness advertising wall (amongst 
others) publicly identify the protagonist by shouting out his 
name. In that scene, another advertising wall for a credit card 
visually displays both the protagonist’s name and personal 
information about him (that he has been a member since 
2037). 
Making personal information public could be an intentional 
design goal rather than an unintended side effect. An exam-
ple is the guerilla-style bus stop display produced for the Fit-
ness First health club chain in Rotterdam (Figure 7). The 
bench nearby the display contains a weight sensor, where the 
commuter’s weight is then publicly displayed on the bus 
a) Bait: the scene visible out of the corner of one’s eye 
b) Switch: the scene visible when one looks directly at it 
Figure 6. Amnesty International Eye Tracking 
(sketch by David Ledo).
stop’s wall. Its purpose is purportedly to motivate people to 
join the health club by intentionally publicizing their weights 
and offering them a price reduction fee of their weight in 
Euro’s in return.  
5. WE NEVER FORGET 
In day-to-day life, proximity is an ephemeral phenomenon. 
The proxemic relationship between parties dissolves as soon 
as they separate. In contrast, systems can tag any proxemic 
interactions as indicating a permanent, persistent (and un-
desirable) relationship that is never forgotten.  
The ‘we never forget’ pattern occurs when systems maintain 
a history of peoples’ past proxemic connections, where that 
history is used to re-establish connections, to trigger infor-
mation exchange, and/or to recreate prior contexts (e.g., 
showing the last-displayed information). When used benefi-
cially, the idea is to remember details that make it easy to 
pick up where one has left off. Unfortunately, this might be 
completely inappropriate in a different context.  
For instance, mobile devices – when brought into range of 
other devices – typically remember any entered credentials 
(such as a passphrase) that allow both to connect to one an-
other. This can be a tremendous convenience: when that de-
vice comes back into range, those credentials are reused au-
tomatically to re-establish the connection, minimizing user 
load. Remembered WiFi hotspots automatically reestablish 
network connections when a device returns to a location, 
while Bluetooth pairings ease device to device interconnec-
tions, such as how a person’s mobile phone is linked to a 
hands-free system in that person’s car. Similarly, various in-
teraction techniques trigger pairings and information ex-
change when proxemics-aware devices are brought close to-
gether, e.g., by bringing mobile devices together [14,15,20].  
On the other hand, this approach can fail for several reasons. 
First, people may do a one-off connection to a device they 
otherwise do not control or trust (e.g., a one-time transaction 
with a public display). If that person happens to pass by that 
other device at a later time, there is no reason for that con-
nection to be re-established (particularly if there is some risk 
involved).  Second, security is compromised. If (say) one’s 
mobile phone is stolen, the thief may be able to explore 
nearby locations to see if he or she can access other devices 
or networks without entering any credentials.  
Third, circumstances change even with trusted devices. For 
example, a person that previously used a conference room 
display to show some personal photos on his phone to visit-
ing friends could have these photos reappear inappropriately 
on the display while walking past it with her work col-
leagues. Or, consider the case of cell phones paired to one’s 
Bluetooth car system, where it automatically displays incom-
ing calls and redirects audio to the car’s speakers. We can 
easily imagine what could happen on a family trip when an 
incoming call from one’s secret lover is broadcast for all to 
see on the radio consul and the lover’s greeting heard if ac-
cepted. As another example, a manager and an employee 
may be working physically close together, where they pair 
their laptops to work on a project report. A week later, the 
manager and employee sit next to each other in a meeting 
discussing the team’s progress. As their laptops get close to 
each other again, the manager’s laptop automatically shares 
the currently opened document, which, in this case, is a sen-
sitive spreadsheet with the wages of all team members. 
Fourth, a person may be unaware that he or she is again shar-
ing his or her device’s data with another person that they had 
previously shared with. This absence of reciprocity (if you 
share with me, I should know that I share with you) is a 
known problem in groupware, where one of the parties may 
be unaware that one’s data is being shared with others. To 
remedy this, such systems should provide awareness of other 
users and their actions [4]. When proxemic connections are 
established, the system needs to inform its users about what 
information is being shared and when, and to whom this in-
formation is made available (who is making a connection? 
[24]). Likewise, users need to know what will happen to their 
information once it is shared [4], and what happens once the 
connection is destroyed. 
Finally, credentials obtained in one setting may be remem-
bered by the system and inappropriately applied to other set-
tings. This ‘one login for all’ is an increasingly common 
practice in other systems, such as Facebook or Google. The 
danger, of course, is that a person who has established a sin-
gle proxemic connection to (say) a particular display may not 
want that connection to occur when they happen to pass by 
other associated displays. 
6. DISGUISED DATA COLLECTION 
Information gathered to provide a certain service is abused 
to build a rich user profile, without the consent of users. 
Systems that track proxemic relationships have access to 
large quantities of data about the behavior of their users. Pub-
lic advertising displays that track the user’s distance, loca-
tion, orientation, and movement are a goldmine for market-
ers, who can exploit this information to figure out which ads 
users are looking at and for how long. Fortunately, personal 
risk is somewhat mitigated as long as the person is not 
Figure 7. The Fitness First health club display. © Dutch ad 
agency N=5, with permission. 
equipped with technology that can be tapped to uniquely 
identify him (e.g., broadcasting cell phones, RFID chips, 
smart cards).  
Unfortunately, many public displays rely on some form of 
computer vision to track proxemic relationships. Given that 
the installation has access to images of its users anyway, it is 
entirely plausible to use image analysis to try and uniquely 
identify users. Systems such as these would make the tar-
geted advertisements from Minority Report a reality. Indeed, 
there are already commercial systems – such as the Aware-
Live Technologies Look product (to be found at: 
http://www.aware-live.com/) – that use computer vision to 
identify characteristics of its users such as gender, approxi-
mate age, and a classification in marketing segments (e.g., 
Generation X). Similar to the AIDA model mentioned ear-
lier, Aware-Live’s mantra is “recognize [demographics], an-
alyze [to make intelligent decisions] and engage [to interact 
with customers in a precise manner]”. 
Similarly, free WiFi services can collect a person’s location 
inside stores by tracking the signal strength and IP of their 
device to different WiFi hotspots. For example, Euclid Ana-
lytics offers services that measure walk-by traffic, visit dura-
tion, and even brand loyalty. If the store offers the WiFi ser-
vice, it can potentially track their browsing behavior via web 
server proxies (http://euclidanalytics.com/).  
These and other data collection approaches can be combined 
to build an even richer user profile. Indeed, this would allow 
systems to exploit the user’s proxemic history, thereby lev-
eraging the ‘We Never Forget’ pattern. Just like so-called 
‘loyalty’ cards track a person’s shopping behaviors, the 
user’s location could be tracked when they walk past differ-
ent advertising displays and locations, where the personal 
profile is both constructed by and shared between these sys-
tems, thereby allowing information to ‘chase’ the moving 
person.  
7. THE SOCIAL NETWORK OF PROXEMIC CONTACTS 
OR UNINTENDED RELATIONSHIPS 
The system tracks your proxemic relations with others and 
constructs a social network on the assumption that you are 
somehow socially related, when there is no relationship.  
Proxemics assumes that increasing social engagement (and 
thus a social relationship) is typically accompanied by de-
creasing physical distance, mutual orientation, etc. That is, 
social engagement leads to people adjusting these factors to 
their mutual benefit.  Proxemic interaction systems do this 
somewhat backwards. They assume that some sensed phe-
nomena (decreasing physical distance, mutual orientation, 
etc.) signals a social relationship, i.e., it treats the sensed phe-
nomenon as causal. This assumption is not always correct. In 
real life, strangers may approach and even glance at each 
other, but no social relationship exists between them. More-
over, not all relationships are reciprocal: while one person 
believes they have a relation to another, the other may not 
reciprocate at the same strength, if at all.  
The assumption that all proxemic interactions imply a social 
relationship is problematic for a variety of reasons. Perhaps 
the most worrisome is that the underlying system may be try-
ing to infer one’s social network from proxemic events be-
tween two people, where strangers are included. This sce-
nario is not at all farfetched. In 2013, Edward Snowden re-
vealed the US National Security Agency’s controversial 
practice of tracking phone call metadata records (the number 
dialed, a cell phone’s location, time and duration of call, 
etc.). They used this information to compile sophisticated so-
cial network diagrams of Americans, ostensibly to identify 
and target terrorist networks. Even if one accepts this prac-
tice, innocent parties may be inadvertently included as ‘false 
positives’ in one’s social network, perhaps due to erroneous 
(wrong numbers) or innocuous calls.  
It would be just as straightforward to create an equivalent 
social network by sensing one’s proximity to others. These 
too could easily include unintended relationships. For exam-
ple, matches between location and time information in cell 
phone metadata records can be used to determine those peo-
ple in the same proxemic vicinity. Eagle et. al. compared ob-
servational data from mobile phones with self-report data, 
and concluded that they could accurately infer 95% of friend-
ships based on observational data alone [10]. This also means 
that 1 in 20 are not friendships (i.e., they are false positives). 
Other technologies can provide even more accurate data of 
one’s proximity to another and thus record that as a potential 
relationship, e.g., facial recognition systems identifying co-
located people in a public place, or passing by the front of an 
identity-sensing device (such as a large display). 
Once created, the social network could be used for a variety 
of dark purposes. Authorities could exploit the social net-
work to identify potential ‘suspects’ by their inferred associ-
ation to an unsavory character. Marketers could use that so-
cial network to identify a potential target audience by their 
association with a known demographic fitting that profile. 
Spammers and phishers could exploit it for their own decep-
tive purposes. In all cases, the agencies involved may not 
care that ‘false positives’ are included, where they may be 
treated as collateral damage or simply as noise.  
While algorithms could perhaps detect and minimize the 
number of false positives, the social network will always in-
clude some unintended relationships.  
8. THE MILK FACTOR 
The proxemics system forces you to move through or go to a 
specific location in order to get a service. 
The rules of proxemic interactions, which we use in our eve-
ryday lives, can be misused to force people to move to or 
from a specific location. In non-computer scenarios, this can 
be seen in the design of supermarket spaces. Products that 
are purchased frequently (e.g., milk, or bread) are located in 
distant areas of the store. Thus, shoppers are forced to walk 
through isles with goods, which leads to increased visibility 
of promoted items and impulse purchases. 
Proxemic interaction systems can force people to position 
themselves in specific places by limiting access to function-
ality to particular locations. For example, all zone-based 
proxemic displays invoke certain types of interactions at spe-
cific distances. While most research systems do this with 
good intensions (e.g., [28,2,30,8,25]), all require its user to 
stand within specific boundaries.  
This can have unintended consequences. MirrorSpace [25] is 
a video conferencing system that mitigates privacy: images 
are blurred when the person is far away and only become 
sharp and identifiable when they stand close to the display. 
If the person needs to be in another corner of the room while 
talking over the link, they lose fidelity. In the video player 
by [8], the motivation for limiting visibility of information is 
to allow some viewers to watch a film with subtitles from a 
position on the right side of the sitting area, while simultane-
ously allowing others to watch the same film without the sub-
titles on the left side of the sitting area. This forces people to 
sit in particular locations if they want to see a movie a par-
ticular way (vs. sitting on the floor).  
A commercial example that exploits people having to go to 
a specific location is the Design Studio S vending machine in 
Japan (see www.design-ss.com/products/2010/09/01/vend-
ing-machine.html?ctg-jp). When potential customers are far, 
the vending machines show advertising images tailored to 
the season, time of day and temperature. However, to see 
what drinks are available for purchase, the potential cus-
tomer must approach the area in front of the vending ma-
chine, which only then shows a drinks menu. However, at 
that point the vending machine uses its camera to covertly 
perform a computer vision based analysis of the nearby cus-
tomer to establish their approximate age and gender, as in the 
Disguised Data Collection pattern. This data is used to “sub-
tly” offer targeted drinks selections. Demographic and sales 
data is uploaded (without consent) to the company’s servers 
for further analytics and marketing use. This is a clear exam-
ple of a dark pattern: the customer cannot even see the range 
of drinks for sale, which forces them to move close enough 
to the machine to make covert data collection possible. This 
also raises the spectre of price discrimination (already prac-
ticed on some web sites), where an identified demographic 
may be charged differently depending on their ability to pay. 
DISCUSSION 
We acknowledge that the patterns we discussed are a sam-
pling rather than an exhaustive list. Even so, they suffice for 
reflection. From our sample, we were able to identify several 
common root problems that can be exploited as dark patterns, 
or that promote side effects that then lead to anti-patterns. In 
the following (1) we discuss these problems in more detail, 
(2) denote how they apply to the aforementioned patterns, 
and (3) aim to identify a code of conduct where applicable. 
Opt-in / opt-out choices are particularly problematic in prox-
emics-aware systems. The overall problem is that a person 
implicitly opts-in simply by entering a space and approach-
ing the proxemics-aware entity, regardless of whether the 
person actually intends to opt into the situation. Currently, 
opt-out requires the person to leave that area, which may not 
be a reasonable choice for them (e.g., as in the Captive Audi-
ence). Opt-out may further inflict uncertainty about what will 
happen to traces of bygone interactions (e.g., trails of per-
sonal information on public displays, as in Making Personal 
Information Public and We Never Forget).  
There is a clear trade-off. Implicit opt-in strategies are popu-
lar because they both simplify interaction (from the user’s 
perspective) and increase engagement (from the vendor’s 
perspective). Yet their high potential for misuse is problem-
atic (e.g., as in the Disguised Data Collection or Unintended 
Relationships pattern). At the very least, proxemic interac-
tion systems must have a way to opt-out if interaction is not 
desired. Leaving the space, while simple, may not always be 
a practical option. Explicit user actions are also possible, 
such as invoking a particular gesture to opt out [17], or turn-
ing off services on personal devices. Yet these require both 
learning and extra work.  
Physical space is imbued with dual meanings. People’s 
practices and expectations of the physical space can be quite 
different from the meaning and practice applied by the tech-
nology. This means that a person may approach a location 
for one reason, but as a consequence they are exposed to the 
system exploiting their approach for another reason (e.g., 
simply wanting to walk past a display as in the Attention 
Grabber pattern).  
In many of the discussed patterns, a user’s context plays an 
important role. For example, being surrounded by many 
commuters in a subway may form highly Unintended Rela-
tionships simply due to the close proximity of others.  
One possible solution is to gather more contextual infor-
mation to better infer whether a person is using the physical 
space as is, or whether they actually have an interest in the 
system. For example, an Attention Grabber can sense a per-
son’s speed to determine whether they are in a hurry, and 
thus let them pass by undisturbed. Unintended Relationships 
can be avoided by comparing its collected data to other data 
sources that mine friendship data, such as social network 
data. Of course, this introduces other concerns. 
Ownership of the physical space is ambiguous. A person 
looking for a quiet corner may consider that space as tempo-
rarily their own, but if this happens in a public area, their 
presence can still be exploited. Yet a public display may con-
sider the installation space around itself as its own, where 
any person (and the devices they carry) in that space becomes 
fair game. While people have social rules that dictate what 
happens when interacting in private, personal, or public 
space, technology can easily violate those rules (e.g., an ob-
noxious display invades a person’s privacy with targeted ad-
vertising as in the Attention Grabber pattern). 
We believe it is crucial to define who owns the space around 
a proxemics interaction system. This is particularly true for 
public spaces that people perceive as owned by them. Yet, 
the definition of a public space is somewhat vague. Consider 
the urinal in the Captive Audience pattern: a company run-
ning public restrooms may own this space, but the person us-
ing it would consider it a private enclave. Ultimately, there 
has to be some control and rules for who is allowed to do 
what in a given space. At the very least, the system must 
make it clear (e.g., by its visuals, or by marking) that it has 
taken a certain amount of space for its own use. 
Attention is inherently sought after in proxemic interac-
tions. The gradual engagement design pattern [20] suggests 
that proxemic interactions gradually reveal information as 
entities approach one another (e.g., as in the Making Per-
sonal Information Public pattern). Whether done subtly or 
blatantly (as in the Attention Grabber pattern), attention of 
the person is demanded – even if that person has no intent to 
interact with the system.  
The problem is that a user’s context (and his or her willing-
ness to pay attention to the system respectively) again plays 
an important role. That is, people should be able to move 
through a space with a proxemic system installed without be-
ing affected by it if they (maybe explicitly) opted out of be-
ing part of the system.  
Accidental proxemics occurs when people unintentionally 
enter what could be interpreted as a proxemic relationship. 
They may approach and even orient themselves towards 
something with no real intent of engaging with the system. 
Yet inferences of such a relationship leads to problems, such 
as engaging people without consent in the Captured Audi-
ence, and the accidental sharing of private information in the 
We Never Forget pattern. If the approach is due to another 
reason (e.g., just walking past a display), it becomes rela-
tively hard to discriminate that action from an intentional 
opt-in to use the system. Bellotti et al. describe this as one of 
the typical challenges in context-aware systems, where it is 
difficult for users to know when their actions are being at-
tended to [3].  
When proxemic systems interpret any approach action as the 
start of a proxemic relationship, users cannot enter a space 
without triggering the system (similar to the Midas Touch 
problem [29]). For example, smart keys for various cars now 
allow one to automatically unlock and lock the doors of a car 
when approaching or leaving the car. However, the person 
cannot physically verify that the doors are locked, as ap-
proaching the car again will unlock them. 
Accidental proxemics is a particularly nasty variation of opt-
ing in vs. opting out. Similar to the other root problems, 
avoiding accidental proxemics is difficult if intention is 
sensed implicitly. No matter how carefully done, the system 
will sometimes get it wrong.  
Ideally, proxemic interactions systems must strike a delicate 
balance between implicit and explicit interaction, and by 
making users aware of what is happening [17]. While the so-
lution is to intervene and override the proxemic system’s be-
havior if it does not correspond with their intentions, it de-
mands that they do extra explicit work.  
CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we reconsidered the vision of proxemic inter-
actions through a critical lens. We identified potential dark 
patterns and anti-patterns demonstrating how proxemic sys-
tems can abuse people either intentionally or unintentionally. 
Based on these patterns, we discussed several common root 
problems and speculated on potential solutions. Solutions are 
at best tentative, but we hope that they could evolve into a 
code of conduct taken into account by designers, with the 
goal of both lowering the risk of intentional abuse and unin-
tentional design flaws. 
Unfortunately, this may be easier said than done. At least two 
parties are involved in proxemic interaction systems: the 
party deploying the system vs. the system’s users. Both may 
have quite different intentions and desires. For example, if 
the goal of system stakeholders is to acquire a person’s at-
tention, the actual users may have little chance of opting out. 
Thus legislation may play a role, as it has in other cases of a 
mismatch in interests. For example, governmental authorities 
have (to some extent) enforced rules to better protect users 
from the excesses of online e-commerce systems, and to limit 
spammers and phishers.  
Another and perhaps much better solution is to consider 
proxemic interactions systems design from a mutually bene-
ficial perspective. No company wants to viewed negatively, 
and we expect good companies will pay attention to how po-
tentially dark patterns can be turned into a good (or at the 
worse a neutral) pattern that balances benefits to the com-
pany, client and product user. This already happens in the 
advertising industry, where the best ads provide value to its 
viewers (e.g., humor, engagement, interest, etc.) as part of its 
service. Indeed, several of our examples already do this. The 
Nikon D700 Billboard of Figure 4 is an example of an enter-
taining and novel guerilla ad that invokes curiosity; its cost 
is also small – the red carpet suggesting the direction to the 
store selling the displayed cameras. Proxemic Peddler (Fig-
ure 5) uses subtle rather than aggressive visuals to strike a 
balance between how it senses and reacts to people’s atten-
tion vs. loss of interest [30]. The Amnesty International cam-
paign in Figure 6 presents an important (albeit disturbing) 
social message to the public. 
Captive Media offers a particularly positive example of in-
stitutional awareness. Their representative told us how their 
policy deeply considers mutual benefits. They consider Cap-
tive Media’s urinal (Figure 2) primarily as an interactive en-
tertainment device into which they incorporate some adver-
tising: it enlivens a time that is otherwise boring, and they 
see it serving as a social ice-breaker (e.g., bars, hotel events). 
During actual urinal use, they advocate that the majority of 
time is for game play, with only a fraction of the time for 
advertisements – that is, the cost of play is small. When act-
ing as an ambient display, they advocate that it must display 
entertaining content at least 50% of the time. They also ad-
vocate outfitting only a portion of the urinals in a bathroom 
with their display, thus allowing people to opt out. Finally, 
they collect experience reactions, where they found that Cap-
tive Media users are overwhelmingly positive.    
Yet this is still early times. Even if proxemic interactions sys-
tems were designed to avoid abuse, problems will inevitably 
cause user frustration, likely due to well-known issues in im-
plicit interaction [3]. This remains a grand challenge. 
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